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I.
INCE the acknowledgment of American independence there have been three great
crises. The first of these came after the
pe,a ce of 1783 when the total returns from
exports were less each year than the interest on
the debts incurred in the revolutionary struggle. The only means of solving what seemed
to be an insoluble problem was the adoption of
a Federal constitution which might guarantee
cooperation and even control over the unruly
States. That crisis was ended, as all the world
knows, in the series of compromises drafted in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 and adopted
in 1788. The second crisis came in the winter
of 1860-61 when the lower southern states seceded from Union which all the thirteen old,
and nearly all the new, states had agreed at one
time or another to be· voluntary. The economic
rights of the planters as well as those of the
planter states were in jeopardy in 1860. Secession seemed to ~e the remedy. But if secession meant ' the permarient closure of the Mississippi to the vast region above the mouth of
the Ohio, there was apt to be war. Likewise if
secession meant the loss to the North of the
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commerce of all the tobacco, cotton and sugar
states, there was apt to be resistance if not war
induced by the industrial states. The then
President concluded too early, as he later allowed, that war, initiated on the part of a Union
which had no right to coerce a state, was the
only solution; and the second great American
crisis took the form of civil conflict.
The third dilemma is now upon us. I t is the
reckoning day of all the industrial countries of
the world, a crisis that grips everybody from the
plains of Saxony to the hills of Minnesota; and
war offers no solution. It is an economic tangle
which involves all the winnings of modern
civilization, a situation which, if not handled
as courageously as that of 1787-88, is apt to
move us all backward toward the primitive life
in which our forebears lived two hundred years
ago. Perhaps a closer scrutiny of the ways
men worked out the first impasse, an honest
review of the blunders of war and reconstruction, and an analysis of the present economic
revolution may suggest moves and attitudes that
might help the country out of the dilemma which
covers the earth.

II.
To make the matter clear it must be recognized that all constitutions and treaties are but

[4 ]

compromises involving interests, prejudices and
social purposes of the parties concerned. There
is nothing about a constitution or a treaty more
sacred than the rights and interests of the people concerned; and any concerted effort on the
part of any group operating under a great social
compact to take advantage of its partners and
thwart the purposes of the agreement is hardly
less reprehensible than an open crime. Men
must be honorable if they would avoid catastrophe. In view of this obvious truism let us
state briefly the purpose and the spirit of the
Federal constitution and the plain understandings of its great authors as well as its patriotic
opponents.
There was a situation in 1785-87 which led
men to covert practices. The preliminary conferences to the general convention of 1787 were
themselves contrary to the spirit and the clauses
of the old Confederation. And if the state
legislatures had been asked in the winter of
1786-87 to grant plenary powers to the delegations that gathered in Philadelphia the next
May, these powers would surely have been
denied. The convention was authorized to
amend the constitution of the Confederation.
Instead it wrote a new fundamental law and,
upon the prestige of the men who thus transcended their powers, the states were asked to
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scrap the old law and substitute an entirely
new system. The stern necessity of the hour
was their excuse.
The next constitution involved three points
which have significance for those of us who
think of possible ways out of an even more
exasperating complex-more exasperating because the unemployed could then go to the
wilderness and live off the beasts, the fowls and
the fishes, and because American men had not
then lost their sense of personal dignity and the
needful faith in one's ability to support one's
self. The first of the great compromises agreed
upon in Philadelphia was a balance of the states
and sections in such a way that no group was
supposed to be able to overbear another; that
is, the Federal power extended to the point of
cooperation but not to coercion. The second
item of the agreement was that commercial
arrangements might be fixed in the congress
upon a majority vote, but such arrangements
must not be allowed to become repetitions of the
old British mercantile system (1660, 1663 and
1673) which had been a major cause of two
revolutions, 1688 and 1776. In the hope of
giving the agricultural states some guarantee of
this, three-fifths of the Negroes in the South
were to be counted in the allotment of representatives. Even more was allowed: the Care[6]

linas and Georgia might import slaves for
twenty years and thus add to the social power
of that region. Any intimation of a tariff like
that of 1828 would have defeated the whole
scheme. With states rema~ning sovereign and
the commercial instinct duly curbed, there remained a third item in the agreement: powers
not actually granted to the Federal combination could never be assumed and made operative
in law.
With these elements in the complex situation
duly guarded, the new constitution was hastened to the states about the middle of September, 1787. It was a momentous issue. George
Mason, Washington's neighbor and co-worker
through the revolutionary struggle, took his seat
for Fairfax county in the assembly in Richmond
in October and prevented a premature discussion of the new constitution in order that the
matter might go before the people of Virginia
without prejudice next March. He wrote Washington every week. Edmund Randolph, governor of the state, published a pamphlet which
advised against adoption without serious amendment. Patrick Henry restrained himself that
autumn with great difficulty. In Pennsylvania
Benjamin Franklin, next to Washington the
greatest influence in the success of the Revolution and then governor of the Quaker state,
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opposed adoption without amendment; and the
people of Pennsylvania were more apt ~o follow
their greatest philosopher than any other leader
whatsoever. In New York George Clinton, by
far the most popular of the chiefs of that state,
agreed with Mason and Franklin. All these
men had rendered such high services in years
past that no one might discount their motives.
Mason was in no sense a self-seeker; Franklin
was in the last phase of his long life, and George
Clinton, while more of a politician than the
others, was far more than a demagogue. Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York: If either
of them failed to adopt, the Union was almost
certain to fail. Moreover these were states
with growing, expanding and democratic populations. About half the people of the country
lived within their borders.
, What Mason feared in the new constitution
was the likelihood that the commercial states
would re-enact the system which the English
had tried to enforce since 1660-high tariffs on
imports and domestic market privileges that
would subject the agricultural states to unjust
direct and indirect taxation. The master of
Gunston Hall was equally fearful that the Federal courts would overrule state laws and approve the usurpation of powers by the Federal
government not granted in the constitution.

[ 8]
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The idea of a great industrial belt with huge
cities, absorbing the marginal savings of the
country as London had done for England and
the junkers, agricultural and industrial, were to
to for Germany, was to him a nullification of the
very purposes of the Revolution. A Federal
government dominated by a privileged group
would be a new British empire erected on the
soil of democracy. Moreover, he was very fearful of the consequences of the constitutional
privilege of importing slaves the next twenty
years. Like Jefferson and Franklin, he wished
to abolish the institution, even though he
owned two hundred Negroes. A wide-spreading democracy with independent economic and
social centres all over the country was the one
hope of the future for him; a balanced economic
system was the essential fact in American life.
What the founders of the United States sought
was a vast union composed of free, self-directing
individuals. Nor had they arrived at this conclusion through personal or group interests.
George Mason was one of the first thinkers of
the time, entirely conversant with the history of
the long English struggle for a more just social
order. And Benjamin Franklin was of the same
mind and immensely popular all over the world.
Edmund Randolph, still the governor of Vir-
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ginia, and George Clinton, not to be overlooked,
were also in accord with this philosophy.
On the other side was George Washington
who in 1765 broke with his patron, Thomas
Lord Fairfax, and his near neighbor, George
William Fairfax, the most powerful men in the
Northern Neck of Virginia at that time, and
showed Patrick Henry and Richard Bland how
to defeat the Stamp Act. He and Mason, as
I have indicated, worked together till the adjournment of the Federal convention. At that
time the master of Mount Vernon and the one
great military figure in the country, grown
doubtful of the democracy he had saved, took
the view that adoption of the work of the convention immediately and without serious amendment was the only alternative to anarchy. He
was the only man in the South whose popularity
was equal to a great conflict with Mason and
Henry; he was the only man who could rival
Franklin in the Middle States. He first grew
nervous, then suspicious. When the eighteen
members of the Pennsylvania legislature broke
the quorum of their assembly (September,
1787) rather than issue a call for a constitutional
convention and offered a series of amendments
on which they would cooperate, Washington
wrote that Mason had probably counselled the
revolt. When the Virginia legislature instructed
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Governor Randolph to communicate with Governor Clinton in order that those states might
cooperate to secure desired amendments, the
communica tion was pigeon-holed, and Washington was informed of the significant factsecret change of Randolph's attitude. Mason
was left in ignorance of the changed position
of the governor. When the master of Gunston
Hall returned to his home there were reports
that his efforts in the recent session to prevent
plural voting of townspeople on neighboring
freeholds and his attitude on amendments to
the new constitution had made him very unpopular, above all in the little city of Alexandria
where Washington's influence was supreme. It
was said that he would be mobbed if he appeared
in the town. He accepted the challenge and
spoke there before a large audience, arguing his
case as only a great and disinterested leader
could argue. Not a hand was lifted against him.
It was clear that the long friendship between
the master of Gunston Hall and the master of
Mount Vernon, representatives of Northern
Neck families whose chiefs had worked and
fought together a hundred and twenty years,
was broken. It was a near-tragedy. Both
men were great planters and great slaveholders;
and both of them were profoundly concerned
with the fate and destiny of the country they
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had done so much to create. The older of them
hoped and worked now for better guarantees of
democracy; the younger thoughtless of democracy and labored incessantly for a great consolidated state. In the hope of counteracting
rumors Mason wrote Washington that winter;
no reply has been printed in their published
works. Later Mason called in person at Mount
Vernon; there is no mention in Washington's
diary or letters of such a visit or a return courtesy. Both great men declined to run in Fairfax
county for the Virginia constitutional convention; but Mason was elected without recorded
effort on his part from Stafford county and
Washington made invidious mention of the fact
and of the rumor that Mason might easily have
been elected for two other counties. Mason
and Henry and Thomas Jefferson, then far
away in Paris, wished the new constitution to
be adopted but only on condition of its radical
improvement; Washington, young James Madison and John Marshall fought for adoption with
or without guarantees, so there was no delay.
I t was an honest conflict of the best men of a
great day and a great state; and the decision
of Virginia meant the success or failure of adoption in the country. Few greater issues in
modern history have been determined on the
basis of more honest convictions.
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When the convention met in Richmond the
opposition in the state was increasing, although
the Federalists were able to elect David Robertson, an avowed partisan, reporter of the debates.
The battle of the giants began. The vital
differences as to the social purposes of the constitution sharpened. Madison and Marshall
sneered at the thought of Federal coercion of
states; they declared that no Federal court
would ever dare to usurp powers over state
courts; and there could be no danger of a new
mercantile system under which the wide agricultural regions of the South and West would be
exploited. Washington was known to stand
behind the brilliant young leaders of nationalism. But Mason and Henry fought to the last
for the ideals of 1776 and (the Morrises and
James Wilson, of Philadelphia, having defeated
Franklin's candidacy for a seat in the Pennsylvania convention) turned to Clinton of New
York for cooperation. They failed to delay
adoption; but they secured agreement to a
series of limiting amendments. It was only
upon a margin of five votes that the great document was accepted in Virginia, only upon the
solemn understanding that the spirit of the law
as well as the law itself would prevail-that is,
no section would be countenanced in attempts to
monopolize economic power for sectional or class
[ 13 ]

purposes.
Governor Randolph had delayed
messages from New York till the decision had
been made and he had otherwise maneuvered
against his former friends. As Mason went
home in sorrowful doubts as to the future of
democracy in America he wrote to a friend that
Randolph was but another "Benedict Arnold."
The friendship between Gunston Hall and
Mount Vernon was broken forever. Since Washington replied to no letters and returned no
visits, Mason did not appear to say farewell and
God-speed to his life-long co-worker when he
set out sadly in April, 1789, to take up the reins
. of the great new American government whose
pr-inciples were still thought to be those of 1776
and whose influence was spreading over Europe
like an irresistible · prairie fire with W a~hing
ton's and Mason's friend, Thomas Paine, preaching the new gospel in pamphlets that sold by the
hundred thousand, including always the Virginia bill of rights-an American Magna Carta.

III.
The honest and able general of the American
Revolution with a new congress before him and
clever cabinet around him, including Jefferson,
Hamilton, and the dubious Randolph, turned
his mind to the more difficult task of directing
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the course of politics over the widest area on
which democracy had ever been applied.
Neither Mason nor Henry could be induced to
take seats in the senate; Willie Jones of North
Carolina, the most powerful man south of
Virginia, would never take office under the new
regime; Franklin was then upon his deathbed
in the city of "Brotherly Love"; and old Sam
Adams looked on from Boston wondering whether the new power setting up in New York, April
1789, was to be more coercive in economic
matters than old England had been under
the ministry of Lord North. The fifty-eight
year old Washington, like William III of England, tried to work the young idealistic Jefferson
and the still younger and imperialistic Alexander
Hamilton in the same team. On the other side
of the Atlantic, where the American fate had
been decided in Franklin's French treaty of
1778 and again brought into doubt in the unwelcometreatyof 1783, the revolution moved in
rapid strides toward violent extremes. The
names of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson and
Paine were more compelling amongst common
men than the names of kings or prime ministers
had been in a hundred years. The eyes of the
world were upon the little group that sat in New
York the summer and autumn of 1789.
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LaFayette sent the new President the key to
the Bastille!
The first trade act of the new regime was true
to the great compromise. Its terms did not
conduce to monopoly, as had been the case in
most other tariffs till this day, but every section labored for its share of possible spoils.
The eight percent customs duty would yield a
yearly income half as great as the interest on
the hundred millions of war debt, state and
Federal. Would direct taxes be paid by the
citizens of states who could not bear their local
burdens and by farmers who could not then
sell their crops either in English or French
markets? The prospect was not unlike that of
1765-if heavy direct taxes fell upon all, what
better lot than that which Bute and Townshend
had decreed? N ei ther the optomist, Jefferson,
. nor the mercantilist, Hamilton, saw a clear way
to success; and without success the constitution
would fail, like the League of Nations of our
day.
A year had not passed before semi-famine in
France and the fears of war in other European
countries had pulled down the bars against imports into Europe. In two years the volume
of exports quadrupled and in four years the
modest tax on imports yielded an income eight
times as great as had been expected. All
[ 16)

Europe was at war and so long as Europe warred
the United States flourished beyond the imagination of the most optimistic: It was the opportunity of history-one of the chapters of accident which have so profoundly affected human
affairs. Under a constitution of the most delicate balances, and adopted with the most
solemn guarantees against all sectional or class
advantage, the application of the first tariff
was delayed so that merchants of all the middle
and eastern cities might take their enormous
orders out of the warehouses before customs
fell due-considerable fortunes thus given by
governmental decree to scores of mercantile
folk. The debts of all the states were added to
the Federal debt and in the process many and
flagrant injustices were openly allowed, with
secret runners carrying the news of future
action to prospective beneficiaries-other fortunes given to preferred folk. All the written
evidences of the Revolutionary debt, then
collected at low prices in a few hands, were redeemed at face value. Virginia had paid the
largest part of her debt out of her own meagre
funds at twenty-five cents on the dollar. Her
people received no consideration from any of
the above named moves. The continental currency was redeemed at one cent on the dollar.
And finally the Secretary of the Treasury, boast-
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ing that a national debt was a national blessing, set up the First National Bank. In this
way order was brought out of the old chaos and
American money was better than British sterling.
It was a great era. Enormous incomes from
unexpected exports; departments of the Federal
system worked like departments of the British
government; a bank of the United States functioned like the Bank of England; and terrible
wars all over Europe gave the markets which
sustained the system. Washington could hardly avoid boasting of the unexpected prosperity
which looked out from every farm and every
hamlet in the new nation. Gouverneur Morris
intrigued in Paris against the French revolutionists to whom he had been sent as minister;
Robert Morris speculated in bonds and stocks,
lands and buildings; and John Marshall pressed
a great lawsuit (himself a party to it) to compel
the state of Virginia to return the vast Fairfax
acres to English claimants, exiled tories of the
Revolution. Could Virginia be compelled to
take lands away from the soldiers who were
making their homes on lands they had won on
the battlefield? Was the treaty of 1783 to be
made valid, a treaty as unpopular in young
America as the Versailles treaty in Germany?
There were many reasons for a patriotic
President to pause in 1792. Had the consti[ 18 ]

tution been violated? There was no clause to
cover a National Bank. A citizen of South
Carolina sued the state of Georgia for the face
value of a paper bill and the Georgia supreme
court denied the suit. Would the Federal
Supreme Court go to the aid of the South
Carolinian against a sovereign state? There
was the solemn treaty with France of ' 1778
under which American independence had been
won. That treaty required the United States
to lend all possible aid to Frenchmen warring
against England. Would Washington observe
the terms of a treaty which the constitution
had made a part of the supreme law of the land?
Hamilton, aided as few statesmen have ever
been aided by adventitious circumstances,
claimed all the advantages of implied powers
and all the benefits of an amazing foreign trade,
set up a wondrous speculation which enriched
tens of thousands of deserving and undeserving
men; and the First National Bank set the example of sharp practices and fortune-giving
which has operated in national banking till this
day. But the fame of "the greatest Secretary
of the Treasury in history" covered all, and
financiers, as well as others innocent of history,
cite the success of that day as proof of the
bankers' right to profiteer. The spirit of 1776
was gone. A group of privileged individuals
[ 19 ]

was beginning in the name of the new con stitution what the three or four score men about
Charles II had done under the mercantile policy
of England; the Earl of Shaftesbury, Sir George
Carteret, the two Berkeleys, and their kind,
were not unlike Alexander Hamilton, the Morrises and John Marshall.
In middle Pennsylvania, on the banks of the
Ohio, in Kentucky, Tennessee, and over most
of the South men named their towns Paris,
Versailles, Bordeaux, and the like. IrrNew
England where men had formerly hated Britain
with unparalleled animosity, the British were
admired and the French allies hated; the South
still hated Britain and admired the French.
Washington said that democratic New England
had turned aristocratic and the aristocratic
South had gone wild with democracy. Would
the great compromise last? When in 1793 the
French Minister, Genet, asked the privilege of
doing in American ports what Franklin and Paul
Jones had done in French waters, Washington
answered in the negative-violating the spirit
and the terms of the treaty of 1778; and there
was an outcry unmatched since April, 1775.
The popularity of the President was eclipsed.
A fame unmatched in modern history went
under a cloud and there remained till the hand
of death restored it six years later. The great
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general who had broken the British empire with
the aid of France now gave assistance to
British imperialists in their twenty-year war to
break revolutionary France. The tide of democracy in Europe and America was stopped:
Napoleon put a master's hand on France; and
the young United States of America enacted
alien and sedition laws in harmony with English
reactionary policy and contrary to the spirit
of both Federal and State constitutions. Jefferson had gone into retirement and Madison
abandoned his great friend in the Executive
Mansion. The young American democracy was
ashamed of the radical creed of 1776.

IV.
Thirty years passed. There was another
privileged group rising in the lower South. The
New England inventor, Eli Whitney, had shown
cotton planters how to profit from a new agriculture beyond anything that Hamilton had
imagined from his mercantile and financial operations. English and American Christian ministers were showing the poor heathen everywhere
that they were naked and that they ought to
put on cheap, gay cotton clothes. Cotton in the
lower South quickly came to be what tobacco
had been to ancient Virginia, arbiter of war and
peace. George Mason, who had warned against
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slavery, was silent in the family vault at Gunston
Hall, and his great neighbor lay in a similar
vault at Mount Vernon. Their contradictory
fears and their warnings were no longer effective.
Thomas Jefferson, an old man at Monticello,
again urged the gradual abolition of slavery in
Virginia, which must have meant abolition in
Kentucky and Tennessee and a definite limitation of the rising Cotton Kingdom. After his
decease in 1826, his grandson fought the same
fight until death silenced him. George Mason,
Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Jefferson Randolph were about to become discredited figures.
In the ambitious lower South there stood the
ardent and able John C. Calhoun. He spoke
the language of planter privilege and rallied a
vast region from eastern North Carolina to
western Louisiana to his side. In Boston there
was the marvelous Webster, son of New England
privilege but recently engaged in threats of
breaking Washington's Union. He was as
ready, if not as clever, as Calhoun to bend the
national constitution to cover the interests of
his set and section. Were the solemn promises
of Madison and Marshall, supported by Washington, in the Virginia convention of 1788 ever
to be applied? Was there no obligation to observe the spirit of compromise, remove the
menace of privileged groups and make the con[ 22 ]

stitution cover the purposes for which it had
been written?
When the decisive moment came, once more
in Richmond, there gathered a hundred men and
leaders, the ablest body of Americans that had
sat down together since 1787. Madison was
there. Marshall, who had lost his great Fairfax law suit because of Madison, was also there.
They did not love each other. J ames Monroe,
last of the '.'Virginia dynasty," presided. Littleton Tazewell was pointed out as the man whom
President Jackson had snubbed. Abel P. Upshur, who talked the language of Darwin, represented Accomac county. Philip Doddridge, a
close friend of John Quincy Adams, spoke for
the Wheeling district and William O. Gordon
of Albemarle stood strong for the Jeffersonian
demand that slavery be gradually abandoned.
Only once or twice in American history has there
been a convention so important in determining
the fate of the United States. If the MasonJefferson ideal of the American constitution were
revived, the Virginians would ally with the
middle west and block the mercantile system
which Webster, Pennsylvania, and the second
United States bank represented and which was
about to assume more of the character of a great
monopoly than that against which Washington
had gone to war in 1776. Thus the wide-flung
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Cotton Kingdom, with its world market, warred
against a new industrial realm which must rule
the Union and dominate the domestic market.
Virginia would decide.
As the decisive day approached, · all the
country looking on, Robert Taylor of Norfolk,
advocate of the Jefferson policy, was compelled
to resign; the misguided people of Norfolk demanded it. J ames Monroe, instructed by Loudoun county to vote for the same programme,
recanted in a strange speech about the French
revolution and retired from the convention;
and curiously enough, having aided the cause of
Calhoun in Richmond he journeyed to Washington to aid Jackson in discrediting the South
Carolinian! Abel P. Upshur made the ablest
speech of the whole convention for a privileged
social order, on the ground that history proved
that the law of the survival of the fittest must
prevail; the slaveholders were the fittestHamilton's "rich, wise and good" people. To
abandon the decree of history was to wander in
a social wilderness. The editor of the Richmond Enquirer yielded his life-long advocacy
of the gospel of Monticello and thus prevented
the establishment of a rival party journal in
Richmond. J ames Madison, worn with age
and tired of bitter controversies, agreed with
John Marshall as he had done in 1788, and
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caused the verdict to fall on the side of the cotton
planters. It was the last great decision but one
in Virginia history and the greatest of Virginians
made the choice. Within two years the departed sage of Monticello was denounced as a
mere dreamer and Thomas Jefferson Randolph
fought his last fight for gradual abolition. A
new gospel was submitted for that of the Declaration of Independence. I t was the work of the
learned Thomas R. Dew who declared with
Upshur that men must ever be governed by the
privileged few, that slave-holding was the basis
upon which the noblest social structure of all
time was being erected. A carefully organized
and stratified society would fix every man in his
place and poverty itself would cease. The
former cooperation between the farseeing leaders
of the Old Dominion and the rising Middle West
was definitely broken. The region that was to
produce in two decades two of the greatest
advocates of the Jeffersonian system, Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas, must seek
allies in the unsympathetic commercial-industrial
East. The votes of the Ohio-Illinois country
would soon be numerous enough to grant the
industrialists of the East a greater navigation
and industrial system than any other country
had ever endeavored to fix upon the masses of
its people.
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Andrew Jackson fought blindly his great battle with Nicholas Biddle, a second if less clever
Alexander Hamilton, and at the end of a temporary, speculative recovery from the drastic
depression which had followed the fall of Napoleon, broke the power of centralized, exploitive
financiering. With the collapse of the Second
National Bank, depression, evident in the low
commodity prices from 1818 to 1846, seized
again the financial-industrial minorities; and
bankruptcies, defaults, state repudiations from
Mississippi to Michigan and from Illinois to
Pennsylvania put scores of thousands out of
employment and started again the migrations
from East to -West and from the older South
to the contested plains of Texas. The politicaleconomic map of the country was kaleidoscopic.
No one could say whether the 1788 objectives of
Mason and Franklin or the promises of Washington, M<l:rshall and Madison would finally prevail.
In the lower South somewhat more than two
million white folk, with "mudsills" of near two
million slaves underneath their economic structure, demanded the privilege of governing the
fifteen million people who composed the rest of
the Union, and they urged anew the privilege of
importing blacks from Africa. Ten thousand
a year were smuggled into the cotton states;
and the greater the number of imported Negroes,
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the greater the number of representatives of the
region in the national congress. As the beneficiaries of slave importations raised their heads
higher and more proudly in national assemblies,
the beneficiaries of the growing industrial monopoly of the East demanded the concession of
higher and higher tariffs in the hope of reaping
greater and greater rewards from the American
market. The two groups were coming to the
mastery of their parts of the Union and one day
the masses of forgotten men in the West would
be compelled unwillingly to take sides and fight
a bitter war to escape the consequences of a
break-up of the Union. Thus the constitution
was about to be captured a second time by one
of the two minority groups whose leaders knew
exactly what they wated.
The issues merged into the inevitable conflict
of 1860 when, after six years of bitter controver. sy, the old conservative Democratic Party,
founded by Jefferson but controlled by the
leaders of the lower South, broke into segments
and gave the new Republican party a plurality
of the popular, and a majority of the electoral
votes. Forty per cent of the electorate thus set
up the new regime; about twenty per cent of the
same electorate talked secession as a remedy for
their prospective ills. Abraham Lincoln knew
little of that past of his country so necessary to
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any statesman; but he was an able, honest
leader of the rising Northwest, with seven and a
half million white people unwilling to be goverened by four million white people of the South.
The Republicans called themselves the heirs
of Jefferson. The successors of Calhoun were
really the followers of Hamilton, a wealthy
minority with trained leaders. Without awaiting the inauguration of Lincoln and the conferences and compromises that must have followed, South Carolina seceded from the Union,
as she had a right to do, and sent a committee
to Washington to settle outstanding claims.
She would take over her forts and appeal to the
cotton; sugar and tobacco communities to join
her in setting up an ideal nation, based on the
philosophy of Upshur, _Dew and Calhoun. It
was to be the best government in the world.
The masters of plantations and the philosophers,
whom the plantations produced, were to speak ·
for and guide the masses of white men and both
own and discipline the four million blacks, so
much in need of discipline and control. Mason
and Franklin and Jefferson had lost in the
South. Would they win at last in the North?
Abraham Lincoln thought of the constitution
more in the terms of Mason, Franklin and J efferson than his unnatural allies, William H. Seward, Thurlow Weed and Simon Cameron, of the
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industrial East. Never was a President of the
Union in so difficult a position. Heeding more
the words of Lyman Trumbull, Benjamin F.
Wade and Zachary Chandler, all ignorant of the
great traditions and the toilsome work of
1776-1789, he made a hasty decision when he
heard of South Carolina's unwise act, and gave
warning to the Senate of the United States that
no compromise whatsoever should be made,
a decision which overwhelmed him with sorrow
during the two years that followed. Elected
on a margin of three per cent of the votes of his
own section, he boldly declared against all
compromise as if all constitutional governments
were not compromises. On April 6, 1861, when
Jefferson Davis, a hesitant secessionist, was at
the head of a confederacy of lower Southern
States, Lincoln renewed the decision of the
preceding December, although only two members of his three-factioned cabinet supported
him in this second assertion of a kind of unionism the constitution did not sustain. Half
aware of the story of modern times, which
showed how many and terrible are the risks of
war, he plunged the masses of people, ninetenths of whom were opposed to the coercion
of one section by another, into the bloodiest
conflict then known to modern history. But
having gone so far on behalf of his western ideal
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of national unity, he had no other course to
.pursue.
All the world knows the outcome; but not
even historians know or appreciate the narrow
margins or the fatal compromises on which
victory turned. In the summer of 1862, the
imminence of English recognition of the South
was so clear that Lincoln freed all the slaves
where he had no power to free them in the hope
of satisfying Richard Cobden and his allies and
at the same time embarrassing the enemy. It
meant the abolition of two or more billions of
southern property, in the event of victory- a
performance which Lincoln and every member
of congress, but one, had declared unconstitutional in July, 1861. It delayed and defeated,
however, the policy of the pro-southern English;
and without the application of this "warpower" the Union would almost certainly have
been lost. The next and an even greater decision came in the creation of a third national
banking system. The most popular act of the
whole Jackson era had been the destruction of
the Second National Bank; and nothing was
more unpopular in Lincoln's region in 1863 than
the idea of a new national bank. But Federal
bonds sold at such a discount in 1863 that
Horace Greeley and Jay Cooke could urge men
to buy them and make forty per cent net when
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the war ended and their holdings were paid in
gold. Bankers everywhere doubted the ability
of Lincoln to win the war. Their interest in the
cause was won, however, in the establishment
of the third national banking system-a scheme
which enabled men with margins of profit to
organize banks in every city, purchase United
States bonds at a heavy discount and then issue
bank notes up to ninety per cent of their face
value. Everywhere men doubled and quadrupled their capital the next three or four years.
Financiers, American and European, thereafter
lent a hearty support to the "greatest democrat
of the age." Within ten years the bankers procured hostile legislation against state banks and
gradually organized themselves into an association which was able in the decades that followed
to guide the savings of every section into the
vaults of New York banks. Nor was there
any strict governmental supervision of a system
in which the surpluses of the whole Union were
so deeply involved. The financiers had at last
acquired a position in the Federal economy
which far surpassed that of Nicholas Biddle
and equalled that of the slaveholders in 1860;
a great oligarchy without effective governmental supervision-government once more of
the "rich, the wise and the good." Within ten
years nine-tenths of the United States bonds
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that Jay Cooke had sold to the masses throughout the Middle States and the West were safely
lodged in the hands of men living in three
Eastern cities: Boston, N ew York and Philadelphia. In like manner other securities found
their places in the same vaults, and men who
studied the art of speculation played a game
which neither the Montagues nor even John
Law of Great Britain ever imagined possible.
The year which followed the enactment of the
third national banking law, congress passed a
tariff which practically destroyed foreign competition in the sale of commonly used goods.
The measure was so extreme that Lincoln declared that he signed the bill only on condition
that repeal should follow the close of hostilities.
The British navigation policy of the 17th century was completely matched. The constitution which George Mason had urged was obsolete. Nothing illustrates this better than the
accompanying act which laid a heavy duty on
southern exports, specifically forbidden in the
document of 1787. As a sort of concession to
the Government, the industrialists agreed in
the tariff of 1864 to allow a sales tax on their
output and a mild income tax on their swelling
fortunes j there were two or three thousand
war-made millionaires. Lincoln was assassinated a few days after Lee surrendered and there
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was little prospect of repealing the tariff of 1864.
In 1868, the sales tax was abandoned while high
tariff duties remained or were increased. And
within four more years men simply ceased to
pay their income taxes. Before 1880 the financiers and the industrialists were fairly united
in a common national policy. As time passed
all the greater industrial units were so associated
that they either broke down domestic competition or were able so to control prices and markets as to compel minor competitors to take
orders from their greater fellows. With the
bulk of the national savings in three eastern
cities and the controlling agencies of industry
next-door neighbors to the bankers, there was a
privileged interest too powerful for any President
to oppose.
The last great element in the picture was
the railroads. In war-time their managers had
reaped great fortunes like their banker and
industrial brethren. During or at the end
of the war, the Government granted hundreds of millions of acres of the public lands
to railway builders without retaining public
control of their distribution. The lands were
sold at a profit to immigrants or to easterners
crowded by .depressions off their ancient homesteads. In 1874 the great trunk lines organized
an association at Saratoga which was designed
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to give them a semi-mastery of transportation
like that of the wool and the steel and the banking chiefs. As time passed the rising lords of the
railways focussed the termini of all their roads
in eastern CItIes. Cotton and pork and tobacco
sold to Liverpool and London had to be shipped
first to New York. And what tended to fix the
rising monopoly of Manhattan was the building
always of bigger and better ships-vessels of so
deep a draught that they could not enter
southern ports. The railway managers were
making the public and corporate canals, and
even the Mississippi River, useless. Industry,
finance, transportation and shipping had won
the war; its chieftains, unhindered with anything
but futile popular outcries on the plains of the
West and helpless wailing in the South, were
the masters of a destiny undreamed of in any
age. One needs but recall Commodore Vanderbilt who borrowed a hundred million dollars at
a clip in London, Jay Gould who stole a railroad
which tied New York to Chicago, and Andrew
Carnegie whose iron and steel stock deals
astounded the men of his generation. The
Union was saved; but there remained hardly a
vestige of the constitution for which men fought
so strenuously in 1788 and died by the hundred
thousand in 1863-65. Five or six years after
Lincoln's death, Chief Justice Chase reversed
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a former decision and declared the greenbacks,
which he had issued in 1862 to save the Union,
unconstitutional. The bankers had demanded
it. Although the volume of business doubled
and sometimes quadrupled every ten years, the
amount of money in circulation remained stationary or actually decreased.
The new masters of the new United States
hardly knew what they were doing; members of
congress and representatives of the dynamic
industrial life like John Sherman or Zachary
Chandler, master of the Republican party, played
the game with a fair degree of safety, because
the westerners could always be stirred to a
bitter hatred ofthe South and southerners always
replied by voting "solid." A greater and an
equally effective influence was the current of
things in Europe. There Otto von Bismarck
fought three successful wars in six years and
united the broken fragments of historic Germany
and set the new Germany upon its industrial
course. Western farmers reaped the advantages which wars always yield American agriculture and billions of dollars worth of farm
products went to the then free European markets. But these wars and changing conditions
coupled with the painful pro~ess of paying the
cost of the Civil War, and aided by Jay Cooke,
master manipulator of railway securities,
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brought on the panic of 1873. Europe and the
United States were in dire straits. But the
English steamboats and the American railroads
carried hundreds of thousands of distressed
Europeans to the United States where the free
farmsteads of the West attracted millions of
unemployed folk each decade. The European
savings of the immigrants, spent in transportation fares, in the building of cottages ori the
frontier and the purchase of implements started
the wheels of industry going again after each
"cycle." The hordes of Irishmen, always leaving the neighborhood of the hated English,
settled in the industrial areas, worked at low
wages and pushed the said wheels a little faster.
It was the curious action and reaction of Europe
that helped Americans recover from the effects
of their titanic struggle of 1861-65. While
European wars, American free lands and marvelous railways performed these functions, new
and better machines hastened the process.
Europeans had abandoned their old mercantile
policies and accepted something like Adam
Smith's free trade programme. Their markets
were open to American products. American
farmers, therefore, shipped wheat and beef,
tobacco and cotton, in enormous quantities
each year. The McCormick binder, the drill,
the mower and other improved implements
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enabled the newcomers, the poor New Englanders in their western habitats and the older Middle
West agriculturists to drive English and German
peasant farmers off their lands and into mills or
compel them to emigrate. It was one of the
evolutions like that which took place on the
Italian peninsula while the Roman republic
was rIsmg. Hordes of small, individualistic,
liberty-loving proprietors were spread over the
vast plains of the upper Mississippi and Missouri
valleys. But these men hardly knew the motor
forces of the society of which they were parts;
they gave little thought to constitutions and
traditions which lay behind them. They were,
therefore, the industrious victims of the economic
system operating always from the industrialfinancial East and drawing off automatically
the annual earnings in business profits or
accumulated local bank deposits. The governments of states made efforts to conserve the
rights of their citizens; but the United States
and its courts steadily supported the interests
of the privileged groups which had taken the
place in national affairs that slaveholders had
occupied under the old Federal constitution.
Consciously and unconsciously the process went
on.
But Grover Cleveland, an honest if illinformed leader of enormous personal power,
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broke into the picture. He thought to change
the drift by reductions of the tariffs. He did
not understand the loud western demand for a
more flexible currency; he never for a moment
associated in his states craft public lands, immigration, railway concentrations and the export of huge masses of cheap farm products.
He thought in terms of individualism and even
states rights, both invalidated by the civil war.
There were three hotly contested national campaigns: 1884, 1888 and 1892-one of the long
and balanced crises of American history. In
each of these Cleveland fought blindly for a
better system and a more decent treatment of
the "reconstructed" South. While he led these
campaigns and won what was called the landslide of 1892, he fell, unawares, into the hands
or under the influence of "high finance" in New
York City. J. Lynde Stetson, chief counsel
of the house of Morgan, was his most trusted
legal associate. The victory of the masses and
the mighty protest against the tariff injustices
turned out to be futile. When the long era of
declining agricultural prices, 1866 to 1893, had
reached the point where wheat and corn were
burnt in place of coal, and the frontiersmen could
no longer retreat from the scenes of their ruin to
fresh lands without cost, there was something
of desperation; there was threat of revolution
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the land of the free. Cleveland chose his
cabinet from old-stage conservatives and made
Richard Olney attorney general at a moment
when the first anti-trust law was about to be
applied; and Olney applied it to striking laborers
instead of nation-wide industrial conspiracies.
The Pullman strike and its settlement, like the
paper money and free silver issues, showed that
the Democratic chiefs, who, like Arthur Pou
Gorman, talking states rights and tariffs for
revenue, were as ignorant of the history they
were making as the Republicans had been in
1870-76 when they drove all the eminent coworkers of Lincoln out of their party. Great
financiers and insurance officials took pains to
contribute to the chests of both political parties;
and both parties were not unmindful of the
sources of promising gifts.
III

V.
In this age of disloyalty to the ideals of 1776,
there appeared the famous young William J.
Bryan of Nebraska, himself as ignorant of the
history and tradition of his country as Cleveland
had been in 1884. But he was deeply concerned
with the .interests of the masses and a would-be
follower of Thomas Jefferson. I t was a time of
as great distress as that which followed the
Napoleonic wars. There were farmers' alli-
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ances, knights of labor, protest meetings and
armies of unemployed, although few men put up
the plea that it was the business of the public to
feed and clothe them. In 1892 Bryan won a seat
in the national house of representatives from a
Nebraska district, strongly Republican. In the
house he made the most effective speeches of
the decade against the "iniquitous" tariff which
laid heavy duties on imports and compelled the
country to maintain vast industrial and financial
trusts. Two years later he broke with the
Democratic administration when he espoused
the cause of silver coinage at the ratio of sixteen
to one with gold. He visited the states and cities
of the restless West and South; he held conferences on party policy; and he made overtures
to the rising Populist leaders. When the Democratic national convention was about to meet
in Chicago, there had already been a "bolt"
from the Republican convention which had sat in
St. Louis and nominated William McKinley,
author of the tariff which had produced the revolt
of 1892 and ally of privileged business; Mark
Hanna was his manager and connecting link
with the East. Cleveland endeavored to control his party and worked even with his bitter
enemy, David B. Hill, Governor of New York,
to that end. Members of his cabinet did all
that politicians could do to stay the tide of
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cnticism. Bryan was ruthlessly pushed aside
in the Nebraska Democratic Convention by the
agents of J. Sterling Morton, member of the
Cleveland cabinet, and not allowed to go as a
del ega te of his state to the Democratic National
Convention in Chicago, the tone of which he
had already done so much to fix. But Bryan
appeared there, nevertheless, as the chief of a
contesting group. It was widely known that
the aged Lyman Trumbull, one of the few socially-minded political leaders of Illinois and
revered as an intimate of Lincoln in his senatorial days, supported the young Nebraskan.
When the test came, the convention listened to
Bryan's protest and his criticism of the social
philosophy of the day. It was the cross-of-goldand-crown-of-thorns speech, unequalled in
American political conventions. The result was
the seating of the Bryan delegates from Nebraska and the almost unanimous nomination of
the thirty-six year old leader. An unparalleled
campaign against the privileged economic heirs
of the Union victory in 1865 followed. But
for the expenditure of unprecedented sums and
the artificial Palmer-and-Buckner ticket put up
by men who "knew exactly what they wanted,"
namely, a small split from the Democratic
ticket in strategic states, like Nebraska and
Indiana, the ora tor of the Platte would have
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been seated in the White House in March, 1897;
and American history must have taken a different economic turn, a turn away from the
industrial goal at which the country arrived in
October, 1929. There had not been an equally
important campaign since 1864; and to give
the people a different turn of thought, Hanna,
if not McKinley, welcomed the chance of war
with Spain-war, patnotlsm, colonies; the
United States was re-entering the complex of
world politics, as an imperialist power.
The McKinley cabinet was in harmony with
the social drift of preceding decades. The gold
standard was maintained; the tariff was raised
once more; Bryan himself helped annex the
Philippines and, in spite of this, waged a campaign against imperialism in 1901. The gentle,
easy-going, half educated McKinley held his
own, only to be assassinated in September,
1901, just after he had repudiated his life-long
protective tariff creed; and the stormy petrel,
Theodore Roosevelt, entered the White House
and waged a campaign of publicity against
"big business" that was bad, while he apologized for "big business" that was good. The
oil and the pork monopolists were denounced;
but the steel trust, the most anti-social of all,
was defended. It was the age of the "muckrackers," and the country became intensely
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aware of the drift toward economic ruin. However, nothing was done nationally till ex-President Roosevelt, angered at the conduct of
William H. Taft, his own nominee for the
Presidency, split the Republican party ' into
halves in Chicago in June, 1912. With two
Republican candidates in the field, Woodrow
Wilson, energetic pedagogue, moved straight
toward Sixteenth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue.
Wilson was the first highly educated man and
acknowledged thinker who had sat in the President's chair since John Quincy Adams, 1829;
he was aware of the economic dangers ahead.
He had, however, received only forty-one per
cent of the popular vote. His cabinet was not
composed of highly trained men, though first
and last two masterful leaders of more than ordinary abilities sat on one side or the other of his
official table. There was a return to the semifree trade policy of 1846; the masterful association of national bankers, unhindered in their
exploitive operations since their beginnings in
1863, was compelled to accept some governmental control under the Federal Reserve System of 1913; and there was some effort to apply
the trust regulation ordered in the law of 1890.
It was an acknowledgment that the country
Ipd not been administered in harmony with the
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spmt under which the constitution had been
adopted. The nation that had succeeded the
old Union in 1865 was now an articulated society,
not unlike the old South, but the majority of
men were unwilling to accept order and subordination. The new society in which the new
masters held seats on the directorates of great
trusts, great banks and even greater railroads
was an under-cover aristocracy. Next to the
President of the country, these industrialfinancial men offered the social patterns of the
time. When J. P. Morgan anchored his yacht
in the Thames, even the King of England took
notice. Andrew Carnegie had free access to
the Kaiser in Berlin; and the Popes were not so
near the throne of Heaven itself tha tthey would
not grant a friendly audience when an American
magnate appeared in the Holy City. Wilson
was the first President in half a century who did
not swing the doors of the Executive Mansion
wide open when a Harriman or a Hill halted his
car or carriage at the Executive gate. Next to
the really great were the chiefs of organized
labor, able to fix the hours of urban toil as the
steel trust fixed the prices of its output. While
they were not "in society," they were socially
important; they were natural products of industrial monopoly.
Below these were the
masses of urban folk moving inevitably towarsl
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proletarianism like their predecessors in ancient
Rome, and the then greater masses of farmers
and tenants making their painful way back to
the peasantry of their mediaeval forebears.
The American nation, though not willing to
acknowledge the fact, was moving rapidly toward the European status from which its
founders had run away. Under the constitution which Lincoln thought he had saved, the
people of the Wilson era were moving toward
social goals which only a minority of the Hamilton party would have tolerated in 1789. The
three million farmer-folk who had started the
western world on the road of revolution had
grown to a hundred million, whose leaders had
worked their constitutions, state, and national
and city, into the most conservative frames of
government in the western world.
Wilson had hardly started his scheme of restoration when the imminence of war in Europe
gave notice that modern states are intimately
connected. He sent the silent Edward M.
House to Berlin to persuade men that war was
no longer a solution to economic problems.
The gentle Texan, author of a twentieth century
Utopia which at that moment enraged senators
and industrialists in his own country, found
Germany domineered by a combination of
agricultural junkers, not unlike the southern

[ 45 ]

slaveholders of 1860, and industrial financial
overlords, economic cousins to the masters of
the United States. At the top of the structure
sat the militarists ready to give the signal for
war upon the drop of the right hat. For an
hour the Texan argued with Kaiser Wilhelm II;
he argued in vain and sadly took his train for
Paris where society was more democratic but
where all agreed that Berlin held the initiative.
There w~s little chance of a peace association of
the greater powers. In London, there was a
regime dominated by what was then called a
"wild radical" from Wales, the irresistible
David Lloyd-George, who meant to re-distribute the great estates of England among the
tenants and landless poor of the country. But
even the most democratic country of the time
looked to Berlin. In two weeks the secret
emissary of Woodrow Wilson set foot on American soil at Boston and learned from the newspapers that Europe was aflame with war- and
such a war as the world had not known since
Napoleon I.
The leaders of the reactionary forces in the
United States had hardly begun their campaign
to thwart and break the schoolmaster in Washington before they found that tariff reforms and
financial subordination were but bagatelles in
a world at daggers drawn and ready to buy at
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top-prices all the foodstuffs of the West and all
the ammunition of the East, and to borrow all
the millions the Americans could possibly spare
at high rates of interest. Great business leaders
hastened to London and Paris to reap. fortunes
which eclipsed the greatest fortunes of the Civil
War. The President proclaimed an absolute
neutrality; but German, English, and French
propagandists came in troupes to argue the
Americans into the belief that each of the parties
to the great war represented the cause of civilization. The leaders of that part of the United
States closest to Europe in economic interest
slowly took the English side; the leaders of the
old South veered more slowly in the same direction; while the great Middle West preached an
isolation which a Henry Clay would have
scorned a hundred years before. Curious fact:
the owner of a great newspaper syndicate felt
himself personally unwelcome in London and the
owners of the greatest mid-Western paper
thought themselves in similar status with the
English, and there were millions of Irish and
German readers of their grievance stories. Wilson came first to think of himself as the logical
arbiter of the mighty contest, though his personal sympathies were mildly pro-British. He
did not lose the campaign of 1914 on the old
tariff issue, as had been expected. Nor did he
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win enough support to take the initiative in a
war-mad world. Two years more, and there was
the coveted national re-election which he won
on the slogan: "He kept us out of war." But to
all discerning minds, the United States inust as
certainly intervene to prevent a German domina tion of modern economic life as England had
intervened to save Europe from the mastery
of Napoleon. But that would be a great advance upon the position of 1898. Would the
intervention advance the American principles
of 1776? Would it prove to be another intense
struggle for the exploi ta tion of weaker peoples?
After more than one vain effort to bring the
Germans to a world peace table, the United
States entered the struggle, expecting that the
mere weight of her moral influence and economic
power would determine the outcome. Before
the end of 1917, it was clear the Germans would
sweep into Paris and set up guns at Calais
that would drive every ship off the narrow sea
if the whole weight of the Government in
Washington were not cast into the scales.
Ex-President Taft warned that a million men
must go across the ocean; Wilson replied: "Why
not five millions?" In a few months enthusi. astic Germans were crossing the ocean to fight
the soldiers of the Fatherland and equal numbers
of Irishmen were on the western front helping

[ 48 ]

their age-long enemies from England. Perhaps both Germans and Irish prayed for the
defeat of their own allies. It was only another
form of the entanglements of modern life. But
the weight of the industrial United States cast
into the scales against the so-called Central
Powers brought victory in 1918 to the belligerent Georges Clemenceau, war lord of France,
and the vociferous Lloyd-George, crying: "The
Kaiser must be hanged in London." It was not
a peace without victory; and Wilson must sit in
person or by means of representatives at the
final peace table, not as an arbiter as between
balanced powers, but as one of a group bent
upon obtaining all the possible fruits of victory.
The reconstruction of broken Europe would be a
repetition of the reconstruction of the broken
South in 1866. But it was a new thing in American history for spokesmen of the United States to
pass upon the fortunes of Europe and even the
Far East. It was the end of the second era
which had begun in 1865. National isolation
and hypernational policies, both economic and
political, were obsolete. There was an opportunity to the new United States with its industrial and financial power surpassing that of all
the warring powers of Europe-the opportunity
of a popular and "disinterested friend" deeply
concerned in the fortunes of mankind in general,
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as Americans had always professed to be. That
opportunity consisted in the grant to the President of an unquestioned mandate as he departed
for the Paris conference. With such a mandate
the world might have been made "safe for
democracy" and the reconstruction of Europe
might have proceeded without the usual injustices and hatreds. The seizure of the great
opportunity depended on the ability of the
leaders, rather than the masses, to realize that
a new world and a new United States were in
the making. The day of privilege and exploitation was about to close; but the beneficaries of
privilege and exploitation could not read the
signs of the time. One has but to read the proceedings of the American Chamber of Commerce in December, 1918, to see this.
The allied governments owed the United
States about eleven billion dollars and the peoples and corporations of the same countries
owed American banks . and corporations hundreds of millions more. If the Germans paid
the allies the damages their armies had done as
the French had been compelled to do in 1871,
all their profits for half a century would be preempted. Nor was this all: the Government of
the United States owed its people twenty-five
billions while the governments of all the warring
powers owed their peoples sums surpassing the
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total movable wealth of their countries prior
to August, 1914. The world had been in many
serious economic plights. It had never been so
completely bankrupt at any preceding moment
in history. These were facts that informed men
in the United States ought to have understood.
They should have shown men everywhere that
there could no longer be economic isolation,
constitutions and national prices to the contrary notwithstanding. But as the congressional election of 1918 approached, it was plain
that the opposition to the great schoolmaster
was coralling with solid blocs the natural race
groups deeply angered at a President for whom
they had voted because he had kept them out of
a war and yet had sent their sons to fight on the
western front. The Germans, the Irish, and
many thousands of Negroes, carried North to
work during the critical years 1917-18, voted
against the mandate needed if Germany, Ireland, and even the Negroes were to be made
secure in the new world peace. I t was the usual
case of men voting their past grievances and
losing their present objectives. The election
gave the older tariff and financial masters a new
(perhaps their last) control in Washington; and
Wilson went to Paris without a mandate.
Every other representative in the conference
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had his country behind him. All the world
knows the treaty that followed.
It was the revival of the hypernationalisms
which had developed from the work of. Cavour,
Lincoln and Bismarck; and every great nation
seized what advantage it could, although Poland
and the little Balkan countries did obtain doubtful guarantees of such independence as they
might maintain in a world still acting in the
ancient spirit of war. The one hope of the future
in 1920 consisted in the chance that leaders like
Taft and Root would join Wilson and put the
United States into the new association of nations permitted by the Treaty of Versailles, an
association not unlike that which Washington
had worked out in 1788. The scores of rival,
jealous peoples of the modern world must unite
in some economic co-operation if debts were
ever to be paid and good will among recent
enemies restored. The United States was the
greatest creditor of all. Its industrial-financial
structure was the greatest of all and the temper
of its people was the least bitter. If the future
was to be secure, Washington leaders would of
necessity have to point the way. The perverted constitution of Mason, Franklin, and
Jefferson would have to be stretched to cover the
welfare of mankind, or the United States would
lose its leadership, its lawful debts, and many
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billions tied into its capital structure. It was
time for a world Washington. Could there be
such a leader?
The opportunity for party advantage was too
great. Although Taft, Hughes, Hoover and a
score of other eminent chiefs endeavored to
swing the Republicans into a forward-looking
position, the years which followed the election
of 1920 were years of hopeless backward-looking,
of exaggerated nationalism, false appeals to the
teachings of the "fathers of 1788." Never has
the history of a country been more misunderstood or dangerously interpreted. For twelve
years; the driving word was distrust of other
peoples; and distrust begets distrust.
A President even more ignorant than the most
ignoran t of his predecessors held office for a
while; and the record of his neglect, if not corruption, surpasses the record of any preceding
leader of the country. Another and a little
better informed chief came to office in 1923
and was reelected in 1924; but no enlightened
leadership followed. The enforcement of : the
Federal Reserve Banking Law was relaxed.
The warnings of declining commodity prices of
the period were ignored. Immigration from
other lands was as good as prohibited; and the
tariff act of 1922 reduced the exports of industry
when the home market approached saturation.
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Isola tion, political and economic, was the slogan;
yet everybody called for the prompt payment
of the eleven billions of allied war debt in gold.
It was a legal obligation, as the obligation of
young America to pay the impossible debt of
1783 had been legal and binding. The allies
resorted to borrowing in the United States in
order to pay; and the Germans likewise borrowed
from the same sources to enable them to pay
the allies. Since European industry might not
sell its output to advantage in the United States,
its chiefs borrowed money from American banks
to enable them to sell in Latin-American markets in competition with the United States.
At the same time the Administrations of Harding and Coolidge loudly asserted their right to
dominate Latin-America, and thus added to the
small advantages of European industry and the
unpopularity of the "monster of the North."
Secretary of State Hughes frankly told the
assembled Latin-Americans in Havana in 1926
that the Monroe Doctrine, hated everywhere
south of the Rio Grande, was a purely United
States affair and was to be applied exactly as
the Government in Washington saw fit: purely
"unilateral." It was the Austrian attitude of
1914 toward the Balkan States.
Thus, instead of moving into new paths as
Washington had done in 1787-88 and Lincoln
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had repeated in 1861, the leaders of the United
States faced backward from 1921 to 1929,
ignoring the most obvious economic and social
facts. There were no more free lands; and
moreover, if the dispossessed farmers of the
era had known of free lands, they would not
have accepted them. For three decades the
schools and colleges had taught their young,
both by precept and by example, that life in the
city was the only life worth living. There were
everywhere great University departments which
taught hundreds of thousands the charms of
industry and the art of super-salesmanship.
Six hundred thousand country folk abandoned
their homes for the city each year during the
larger portion of this period. There were few
immigrants from other countries; and what there
were lingered in the cities, arousing the anger
of organized labor. With no free lands and few
immigrants, the native population ceased to
increase as in times past. Women did not care
to bear children. They disliked the drudgery
of the household and so apartments, hotels
and chain restaurants became the craze. Few
were willing to be caught at the old-fashioned
tasks; the family was a declining factor in life.
Nor were conditions in Europe better. Although ten million men had been killed and as
many more disabled for life, there were appar-
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ently still too many people. The unemployed
crowded into the cities. Having fought valiantly in the great war, governments could
hardly decline to feed and clothe them in time
of peace; but the more help governments gave,
the greater the demand for help. In times past
the poor and unemployed of England and Germany had migrated to the United States,
Canada, Australia and Argentina. Now immigrants were, as we have seen, unwelcome, nor
were the unemployed of Europe willing to migrate to the far borders of civilization. They
loved the lights and noises of great cities, even
when they begged their daily bread. Much, if
not most, of the personal self-respect .of the
eighteenth century had gone, disappeared in the
era of industrialism. It was a curious reactionary state of mind: "All men are entitled to support from their fellows."
With the advent of Herbert Hoover as President, there was a leadership more familiar with
the adventures of the mining camp and the
manipulations of stock markets than with the
traditions and the complications of the United
States. The "great engineer" was utterly unaware of the dangers ahead of him. University
professors talked of the certain disappearance
of poverty; United States chambers of commerce
preached the same doctrine, apparently unaware

[ 56 J

of the fact that half the farmer folk of the nation were hardly able to earn their keep. On
account of mass production methods, American
industry was still able to sell certain goods in
other countries; the declining home market was
steadily boosted by super-salesmanship and the
deceptive propaganda that machine farming
would work a new era, even while tariffs were
operating adversely; and to support all this,
credit was everywhere granted on the easiest of
terms. It is difficult to imagine the performances of the Coolidge-Hoover years. Two great
utility super-organizations, one in the East, the
other in the West, pulled into their control
nearly all the electric power concerns of the
country. A small Virginia lighting system,
built by amateurs and even farmers, was paid
ten times its own valuation in stocks issued by
a subsidiary company of a subsidiary company
of Samuel Insull, the London newsboy grown to
be autocrat of Chicago. The greatest banks of
the country became interested in the supersalesmanship of billions of such stocks. The
Shenandoah River was to be dammed and a vast
stretch of that charming region was to be covered in water in order to perfect the control of
ancient Virginia by Chicago "undertakers."
The urban world having gone half-mad with
movie entertainment, subsidiary concerns of the
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General Electric Company of the East organized affiliates for the building and control of
the movie houses and, under one cover, issued
stocks to the amount of sixty-eight million dollars. These were taken at fifty dollars each by
a public, unwarned by their own bank officials,
state or national. Later the agent of the selling company set up a "short sale" campaign on
the stock exchanges and reduced their fiftydollar shares to seventy-five cents each. The
public lost about sixty millions. The very
eminent and humane chief of these operations
thought himself, as others also thought, fit
successor to George Washington; great business
leaders hailed him as a master magician of high
integrity. Anything might be done in New
York. Since Chicago and other plains cities
had built themselves skyscrapers like those of
the McKinley-Roosevelt days, the masters of
Manhattan now dynamited vast foundations
in their solid rock subsoil and erected business
structures thirty, fifty, and a hundred stories
high--offices, movie houses, and radio cities to
meet the demands of half a hundred years to
come. Everything had to be on Manhattan
Island and everybody in the United States must
see the vast complex or die in provincial ignorance. The subways, the surface lines and
the overheads, not to mention the thousands of
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cabs, carried vast masses of people at unprecedented speed in and out of the city every day.
To finance these buildings, transportation lines
and racketeering politicians, the country was
taxed through the sales of enormous bond and
stock issues, payable ten, twenty and fifty years
hence. Nearly everybody fell for these speculations, and most people thought themselves
unfortunate if they could not live in some
elaborate house or apartment in New York or
some other "modern city." It was the CoolidgeHoover age and the Empire State Building was
its monument-today standing half empty and
begging sightseers to spend their half dollars
just to take a ride in the elevators. And what
New York did, Richmond or Kansas City, with
vast stretches of land all about them, must do.
There had never been such an era; and nearly
all Americans shouted: "Grea t is the age of
. passing poverty."
And parallel to this was the unhindered accumula tion of nearly all the earnings of the
country in a few centres. The comptroller of
the currency paid less attention than ever before
to the limiting clauses of the Federal Reserve
Act. Banks set up affiliates to do what they
might not do in their own names. · Associations of banks sent agents to Germany in 1926
to lend hundreds of millions, even billions of
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credit, at high rates and on poor security; and
then co-opera ted in the boosting of the sales of
these German bonds to their clients at a profit.
A somewhat different loaning system was applied to Latin-American countries. But whether
bankrupt Europe or doubtful Spanish America
wished huge loans, the means were found to
meet the wish and the government officials
failed under the constitutions of 1787 and 1865
to warn the people against putting their savings
into the great hopper. Perhaps ten billions in
addition to the eleven billions due the Government were thus disposed of for slips of paper
without proper guarantees of their value. It
was the proceeds of these loans that enabled poor
foreigners to pay for American automobiles,
typewriters and other machines-a false appearance of prosperity soon to become obvious to all.
And while the new and amazing performances
of electric magicians, skyscraper builders and
foreign credit lenders operated day and night to
manipulate the bewildered masses, the older concerns of the country fell into line. General
Motors poured more and more stocks onto the
market; the railroads, never quite free of watering their securities, added immensely to their
obligations; and steel companies, cement manufacturers and even rural bankers gladly tied
themselves into the dangerous structure. Nicho-
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las Biddle had never imagined such gullibility
of his public. Nor might one safely criticize or
warn. If one said railroad securities were onethird water or that the electric power holding
companies were due for a fall, the great officials
of semi-sacred insurance organizations would
cry: "Bolshevism." Thus the hundred billions
of worthless stocks must continue to float, lest
the reserve investments of the country be called
into question. I t was a case of certain wreck if
the process went on, of vast disaster if it stopped.
One of the candidates for the nomination to
the Presidency in 1932 wrote in a letter as yet
unpublished: "The time has come for business
men to take over the constitution and apply
it. We must be governed from the top and
all other elements of American life must be
subordinated and fitted into the picture, otherwise there is chaos." Nor was the suggestion
so far from the fact. Five hundred men received a million dollars a year income and from
the Morgan revelations one may surmise that a
thousand others received similar incomes but
failed to report them for taxation. Bethlehem
Steel directors voted themselves bonuses of a
million dollars each for their fine management
and North Carolina tobacco manufacturers
were hardly less liberal with themselves.
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Nor was the structure badly fitted together.
United States Steel products sold all over the
country at the same prices, twice as high as in
1914. A drill, a mower or an automobile was
everywhere the same thing and agents were commanded to sell so many a year or lose their jobsthe price always the same. And if farmers and
country folk could not pay, they were allowed to
advance ten dollars, receive the article and then
pay regularly the next two or three years when
the car or binder might be well-nigh worthless.
High-power salesmanship. But while all prices
of stabilized industrial goods in the United
Sta tes were fixed by industrial committees or
single autocrats like Henry Ford, the rest of the
world might have the same article at lower rates.
The so-called Webb law of 1918 allowed American manufacturers to fix prices abroad low or
high in order, like the German cartel system of
1914, to break down competition. The great
home structure rested secure upon the protected
home market. At the same time it set itself the
task of lending money abroad in order that
foreigners might buy American raw materials
and compete with their own industrialists. It
was a marvelous development of the democracy
set up in 1787.
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VI.
Such was the artificial world of 1929 tottering
under the accumulative grievances of the American people and the angry-minded states of Europe, hardly able to see that the Treaty of
Versailles, good or bad, was a world economicmilitary constitution, not unlike that of 1783
or 1763. If the structure of the Coolidge-Hoover
prosperity were to stand, the League of Nations
must be made the centre piece of the hated
treaty and there must be an imaginative leadership not unlike that which wove together the
thirteen jealous and quarrelsome American states
of 1787. There must be some solution of the
tariff problems growing more acute every year;
and emigration from overcrowded countries
must be accommodated somewhere in a vastly
undeveloped world. In the United States the
drift to the cities must be deflected to less developed regions like the old South or far Southwest. If there were no longer free lands, there
was cheap land. The world must get together,
not to make ready for another war in which all
would be lost; but to keep the peace. The
great day for that had been in 1920. But having failed then, there was a possibility in 1929.
But the new President called a congress committed to backward trends. Instead of leading
its unruly members, he permitted them to
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wrangle a half year about tariff advantages for
individual, party and sectional interests. Instead of striking a vigorous hand into the European tangle, he trusted to the fa tuous Young
Plan as a cover under which Germany and
France might settle their economic differences.
While talking of everlasting prosperity, the solid
rock foundations under New York suddenly
gave way in October, 1929. When the New
York stock market collapsed, the New York
bankers trembled. When the New York bankers trembled the gods of the system were discredited. Anybody might criticize; and everybody indulged himself freely. The President did
nothing. Congress slowly enacted a tariff which
all thoughtful men knew to be both wrong and
economically dangerous. The President signed
the bill and hoped for prosperity, unaware that
high tariffs require immigration and free lands
in order to be highly effective. Prosperity was
not just around the corner. All Europe fell
into a worse plight than before. Little buying
anywhere could be expected. Installment salesmanship collapsed at home. The banks began
to fail. Some of the truth of the situation slowly
seeped into business men's minds and many of
them committed suicide rather than confess
their sins or attempt to reconstruct their social
order. In 1932 stock values had fallen about a
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hundred billions; the railroads were bankrupt
and begging Government . to save them; the
insurance authorities were uneasy day and night
lest the world know how little value there was in
their "immense reserves;" and there were twelve
million people out of employment, gathering
more and more in the cities where they demanded the right to work in a world that needed
fewer workers every year, a world with a relatively decreasing population. Had George Mason or Alexander Hamilton been right in 1787?
The system had collapsed and the tendency in
every section of the country was toward a more
and more primitive life. If nothing were done,
peasantry for farmers, like that of Europe since
time immemorial, and proletarianism for the
city masses, like that of ancient Rome, would
be hastened. The old constitution must be
made new and no constitution could be made
successful without many and intimate contacts with the industrial world everywhere. To
accomplish so great a change among a people
taught to move in contrary directions by their
politicians, their race group leaders and the
schools, high and low, would be little short of
miraculous; yet miracles are sometimes wrought.
The object, avowed and unavowed, of the
electoral campaign of 1932 was to work the
miracle.
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To work it, some heroic measure must be
intelligently applied. The first of these is the
acceptance of the fact that securities without
real value behind them must be gradually
written off, even when millions of · innocent
purchasers must suffer. Railroads, so important
to a modern state, mus(cease to pay dividends
or interests on paper values. That means
four to five billions of deflation and permanent
release of some hundreds of thousands of workers.
Insurance companies that hold hundreds of
millions of watered securities must recognize
the fact and seek some way to meet the proper
demands upon them-a hard conclusion which
involves the fortunes of millions of people. With
railroads and insurance companies and labor
relations readjusted, the artificial produce and
food markets of the cities must be freed from
their "exaggerated overheads" under which
worthless securities have been issued to the
people. If competition amorig commission merchants and distributing agencies can not be
established, then little dictatorships will have
to be set up. Farmers can not function in a
society which requires consumers of milk to pay
ten cents a quart and leaves the producer only
three cents a quart. Apples at a dollar a barrel
in the orchard and ten dollars a barrel to the
consumer represent an injustice almost unprece-
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dented. There must be some equalization as
between the masses of producers and the masses
of urban consumers, else there can be little
margin of returns on which the purchase of
industrial goods depends. If these things be
done, something like a third of the city populations will find themselves unnecessary. The
most perfect labor organizations in the world
can not overbear the great facts of life. These
superfluous workers in the mills, in the political
gangs and in the offices of magnificent skyscrapers, like their predecessors of Europe in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, will
find places on the cheap lands of the South and
West. And, like their predecessors, their success
will depend upon their initiative and their
courage to meet a hard situation. Unlike the
governments in times past, the governments of
today stand ready to lend aid. And one only
needs to read the reports of the proceedings of
the Banking Committee of the Senate today to
see what must happen to financial and industrial
leaders who have conspired together for decades
to exploit the public. With these difficult
domestic changes under way, an equally difficult task presses from abroad.
The billions of money due the United States,
both public and private, can not be promptly
repaid. The great war, due to industrial rival-
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ries and historic hatreds, left a burden which can
no more be lifted than the Americans of 1787
could repay in gold the millions of paper dollars
which had been accepted in good faith on the
word of as able and honest public men as ever
served any country. The most of the world
public debt simply has to be written off, like
the worthless industrial securities of the United
States payable in 1980. When this is done, the
hostile trade barriers must be reduced, if not
broken down. These barriers are due more to
the teaching and example of the United States
than to the influence of European statesmen.
The United States must, therefore, take the
lead in correcting the evil. When debts are
adjudicated and trade barriers are lowered, there
will remain the third and last great task, the
reduction of costly armaments.
These are the greater leads on the way to the
new world, the new United States operating
under the reinterpreted constitution of Washington arid his fellows. The minor problems
may be worked out more slowly. But it must
be a new world, a new attitude toward constitutions and a recognition that privileged groups
always work their own ruin, if not regulated by
government; and working their own ruin, they
work that of their fellows in vast numbers.
The United States have gone a long way since
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1865, a longer way since 1787; but a vaster future
is still before us and the principle of democracy
is as vital today as in 1776.
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